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Abstract 
The impact of cyber war can be profound. We develop a Mathematical model to better understand the cyber war scenario. This 
paper describes the behavior of different group participating in cyber war supported with simulated results. It also presents the 
stability analysis of the model. In this sense, the purpose of this work is to introduce a Mathematical Model to analyze and give a 
closer view of cyber war. 
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1. Introduction 
As the world becomes more networked, more crucial systems become susceptible to attacks in cyberspace. 
Developments in computers have made possible far reaching changes in all areas of life. The rapid growth in the 
fields of computing and communications and the ongoing improvement in the performance of computerized systems 
have created a new space in the world. Cyberspace, a space created not in nature but by human beings, has the 
potential for incredible benefits as well as unknown risks. Cyberspace was formed by connecting computerized 
networks that communicate among themselves. Cyberspace is manmade, will also be exploited by human beings for 
their purposes. Cyber warfare concerns itself with finding weaknesses and exploiting them. There are three major 
sectors targeted by most nations involved in cyber warfare: financial, infrastructure, and governmental. Financial 
attacks could interrupt the world’s major markets by taking down electronically-controlled commodity exchanges, or 
by shutting down web-based operations of major banks or retailers. Infrastructure attacks can damage a nation by 
shutting down critical utility systems, such as electrical grids, or by wrecking havoc on others, such as opening 
dams, or interfering with the air traffic control system. Governmental attacks can shut down the ability of 
government officials to communicate with one another, steal secret digital communications, or release things like tax 
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information, social security information, or other personal data to the public.  
One of the first known acts of cyber-warfare was a DDoS attack on Estonia, in 2007, when the whole country’s 
Internet access was massively disrupted.   
Cyber warfare is a term used to describe the use of the Internet to wage war in the virtual world, often with real 
effects in the physical world. Although generally cyber warfare refers to attacks from one self-governing state on 
another in cyberspace, it may also be used to describe attacks between corporations, from terrorist organizations, or 
simply attacks by individuals called hackers, who are supposed as being aggressive in their intention. In recent 
years, cyber warfare has become an issue of much concern among the major nations on the planet, and virtually 
every national military now has a branch dedicated to both conducting and protecting against cyber warfare. 
Cyber war is Internet-based conflict involving politically motivated attacks on information and information systems. 
Cyber war attacks can disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter 
classified data, and cripple financial systems among many other possibilities. 
According to Jeffrey Carr, author of "Inside Cyber Warfare," any country can wage cyber war on any other 
country, irrespective of resources, because most military forces are network-centric and connected to the Internet, 
which is not secure [1]. For the same reason, non-governmental groups and individuals could also launch cyber 
warfare.   
The most effective defence against cyber war is securing information and networks. Security updates should be 
applied to all systems including those that are not considered critical because any vulnerable system can be co-opted 
and used to carry out attacks. Measures to mitigate the potential damage of an attack include comprehensive disaster 
recovery planning that includes provisions for extended outages. 
The computer world of today is all about computer networks and the use of stand-alone computing has become 
more or less outdated. A computer network can be seen as a collection of more than one inter – connected computers 
that enable the users to share resources, exchange data files or perform electronic communications. The Internet is 
seen as a huge reservoir of useful information that has empowered mankind in more ways than one can count, but 
there has been a constant increase in the number and strength of attacks on the cyber world. The nature of these 
attacks is constantly increasing in complexity, not only for the Internet but for any network of interconnected 
computers. For the best possible solution we use Mathematical modelling as a tool to understand and identify the 
problems of cyber war. We develop a model to characterize the problem faced by computer networks with the 
attacks by Cyber war. Such kind of modelling is supposed to help in better understanding of the problem, but to 
allow such models to be practically workable, it is extremely important to provide a quantitative interface to the 
problem through the model. 
 The literature on mathematical modelling was considered to be essential because of the overall task played by 
the process of modelling in the entire work. The book entitled A First Course in Mathematical Modelling by Frank 
R. Giordano, Maurice D. Weir and William P. Fox was consulted to expose the practical applicability of 
mathematical modelling in real life situations and the book Mathematical Modelling by J. N. Kapur was really 
useful in applicability of modelling methodology during any kind of modelling circumstances [2-3]. Research in 
Mathematical modelling and simulation are the major area to implement various real world problems.  J. Jormakka 
model led cyber warfare using game theory [4]. Brenner discussed about different types of cyber threats [5]. Various 
resources give the insight idea about cyber warfare which helps enormously to present the cyber war scenario as a 
mathematical model [6-9]. Tanachaiwiwat proposes a new Worm Interaction Model which is based upon and 
extending beyond the epidemic model focusing on random-scan worm interactions. It propose a new set of metrics 
to quantify effectiveness of one worm terminating other worm and validate worm interaction model using 
simulations. This paper also provides the first work to characterize and investigate worm interactions of random-
scan worms in multi-hop networks [10]. Most of the scientist are working on the area of mathematical modeling for 
better solution against cyber attack [11-12]. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce Model Formulation which deals 
with the actual formulation of the proposed model, and includes a description of the relevant terminology, the 
underlying assumptions, the variables and parameters involved, and then the formal representation of the model 
using a system of ordinary differential equations. This section describes the Mathematical model that is used to 
analyze the cyber warfare, and presents theoretical results supported by simulated results. Section 3 presents detail 
analysis of the model with simulated results. In Section 4 we discuss the stability analysis of the model.  
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2. Model formulation 
Mathematical modelling provides a conceptual framework in which the researcher can tap into real systems and 
determine a particular description. Developing this description involves the ability to tell a physical or biological 
story using logic, notation, and mathematical techniques. Modelling is a procedure, rather an iterative procedure that 
requires the repetition of a number of steps. One begins this process with investigation of a real system. We outline 
important characteristics of cyber war and translate these into the mathematical notation, sketch the model, and 
interpret. In this section, we introduce mathematical concepts that will be used to evaluate and analyze the model. In 
mathematical modelling, long-term behavior of the solutions of the model is a key point of interest.  
In this work we discuss the cyber war between two groups by spreading information in the presence of third 
group. By spreading information we mean information spread by mass media (an electronic and printing press, the 
Internet) between two states or two organizations. The international organizations react to occurring processes in the 
modern world to minimise the impact of war. Therefore in the course of cyber war we consider association of the 
international organizations as the third side. We consider that cyber war is conducted against each other (Group X 
and Y), and by the third side mean the group Z. The peacemaking organizations in regular intervals react to intensity 
of cyber attacks of the opposite sides. Exact analytical solutions are found in the model and the model is simulated 
in different condition which supports the theoretical approach. Figure 1 shows the Cyber war scenario between two 
groups X and Y in the presence of third group (peacemaking) group. 
  
 
 
Fig.1. Cyber war scenario. 
 
 
According to the modelling methodology, an important part of the model formulation process is to clearly 
identify the assumptions made in the model while abstracting from the real world situation to the mathematical 
model. 
The basic assumptions of our model are as follows: 
There are basically three groups which participate in the cyber war X, Y and Z.  X and Y are opposite sides and Z is 
peacemaking organization.  At the moment of time t ε [0,∞) quantity of the information extended by each of the 
sides X, Y and Z are  ଵܰ(ݐ), ଶܰ(ݐ), ଷܰ(ݐ) respectively. The quantity of information at the moment of time t, is 
defined as the sum of all annoying information which is extended by each of the sides. The basic assumptions of the 
model are as follows: 
 The antagonistic sides, despite increasing appeals of the third side, intensify cyber attacks. 
 One of the antagonistic sides, under the influence of the third side stops, eventually, cyber war while another 
strengthens it. 
 Both antagonistic sides, after achievement of a maximum of activity, reduce it under the influence of the third 
side, and through final time, and at all stop cyber attacks. 
In the first case, it is necessary to expect transformation of cyber war in a hot phase, in the second it is less probable, 
in the third it is at all excluded. 
Another important demand of the modelling methodology is to identify and describe the different variables and 
parameters used in the model formulation process. In the model we assume a as an indicator of aggression of the 
opposite sides, b an indicator of their willingness for peace, listening to peace-making appeals of peacemaking 
X Y 
Z 
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organizations, c an indicator of peace-making activity of the peacemaking organizations. We assume that peace-
making organizations are not awake and react only to already initiate Cyber war so the Initial conditions are as 
follows: 
ଵܰ(0) = ଵܰ,  ଶܰ(0) = ଶܰ, ଷܰ(ݐ) = 0.  ଵܰ(0),  ଶܰ(0)ܽ݊݀ ଷܰ(0) non-negative constants, thus: 
If  ଵܰ(0) > 0 ܽ݊݀ ଶܰ(0) > 0, then both sides are initiator of cyber war. 
If  ଵܰ(0) > 0, ܽ݊݀ ଶܰ(0) = 0, then the first side is the initiator of cyber war. 
If  ଵܰ(0) = 0 ܽ݊݀ ଶܰ(0) > 0, then the second side is the initiator of cyber war. 
 
Based on our assumptions, Mathematical model of cyber war consists of the following system of ordinary 
differential equations: 
 
 
⎩⎪
⎨
⎪⎧
ௗேభ(௧)
ௗ௧ = ܽ ଵܰ(ݐ)− ܾ ଷܰ(ݐ) = ݂( ଵܰ, ଶܰ)
ௗேమ(௧)
ௗ௧ = ܽ ଶܰ(ݐ)− ܾ ଷܰ(ݐ) = ݃( ଵܰ, ଶܰ)
ௗேయ(௧)
ௗ௧ = ܿ ଵܰ(ݐ) + ܿ ଶܰ(ݐ) = ℎ( ଵܰ, ଶܰ)
         (1) 
 
In the model (1) rate of change of quantity of the information spread by the first and second sides linearly 
depends on quantity of information extended by the sides and the peacemaking organizations. Rate of change of 
quantity of peace-making information extended by the third side linearly grows or is directly proportional to 
quantity of information spread by all three sides. The third side initially does not spread any information. 
These constant factors are model constants. In the model (1) speed of change of quantity of the information 
spread by the first side (X) and second sides (Y) linearly depends on quantity of information extended by the third 
sides and the peacemaking organizations.  
Now we investigate the development of Cyber war at various values of D. 
The solution of the system (1) is given as   
 
Case-1   ࢇ૛ − ૡ࢈ࢉ > 0     
 
ଵܰ(ݐ) = (ேభିேమ)ଶ ݁௔௧ +
௕௖(ேభାேమ)௘ഊభ೟
ఒమ√஽
− ௕௖(ேభାேమ)௘
ഊమ೟
ఒభ√஽
       (1.1) 
ଶܰ(ݐ) = (ேమିேభ)ଶ ݁௔௧ +
௕௖(ேభାேమ)௘ഊభ೟
ఒమ√஽
− ௕௖(ேభାேమ)௘
ഊమ೟
ఒభ√஽
       (1.2) 
ଷܰ(ݐ) = ௖(ேభାேమ)√஽ (݁ఒభ − ݁ఒమ)          (1.3) 
 
Case-2   ࢇ૛ − ૡ࢈ࢉ = ૙ 
 
ଵܰ(ݐ) = ேభିேమଶ ݐ݁௔௧ +
ேభାேమ
ଶ௔ (ܽ + 4ܾܿݐ)݁
ೌ
మ௧        (1.5) 
ଶܰ(ݐ) = ேమିேభଶ ݐ݁௔௧ +
ேభାேమ
ଶ௔ (ܽ + 4ܾܿݐ)݁
ೌ
మ௧        (1.6) 
ଷܰ(ݐ) = ܿ( ଵܰ + ଶܰ)ݐ݁
ೌ
మ௧          (1.4) 
 
 
Case-3   ࢇ૛ − ૡ࢈ࢉ < 0 
 
ଵܰ(ݐ) = (ேభିேమ)ଶ ݁௔௧ +
√ଶ௕௖(ேభାேమ)௘
ೌ
మ೟
√ି஽
 sin (ඥ଼௕௖ି௔మଶ ݐ + ߠ)      (1.7) 
 
ଶܰ(ݐ) = (ேమିேభ)ଶ ݁௔௧ +
√ଶ௕௖(ேభାேమ)௘
ೌ
మ೟
√ି஽
 sin (ඥ଼௕௖ି௔మଶ ݐ + ߠ)       (1.8) 
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ଷܰ(ݐ) = ଶ௖(ேభାேమ)√ି஽ ݁
ೌ
మ௧sin (ඥ଼௕௖ି௔మଶ ݐ)        (1.9) 
 
 
Where, 
ߣଵ = ௔ିඥ௔
మି଼௕௖
ଶ  and ߣଶ =
௔ିඥ௔మି଼௕௖
ଶ   
 
 
Now we explore the detailed analysis of the model at various values of D with simulated results.  
3. Analysis of the model at various value of D 
 
Case 1   D =ࢇ૛ − ૡ࢈ࢉ > 0 
 
In this case, a square of an index of aggression more than eightfold product of indexes of readiness for the peace-
making activity that clearly specifies in high aggression of the opposite sides in Cyber war. 
 
Case 1.1  (ࡺ૚ = ࡺ૛)  
 
In this case when the peacemaking organizations have not undertaken preventive measure, and the opposite sides 
have begun cyber war under equal starting conditions under the influence of the peacemaking organizations on the 
first and second side, is ineffectual they strengthen cyber attacks. 
From (1.1), (1.2) and with the account ( ଵܰ = ଶܰ) we will receive 
ଵܰ(ݐ) = ଶ௕௖ேభ√஽ + ቀ
௘ഊభ೟
ఒమ√஽
− ௘
ഊమ೟
ఒభ√஽
ቁ → ∞        (2.1) 
ଶܰ(ݐ) = ଶ௕௖ேభ√஽ + ቀ
௘ഊభ೟
ఒమ√஽
− ௘
ഊమ೟
ఒభ√஽
ቁ → ∞, when ݐ → ∞      (2.2) 
ଷܰ(ݐ) = ௖ேభ√஽ (݁ఒభ − ݁ఒమ) ≥ 0          (2.3) 
 
At ݐ ∈ [0,∞)  ଷܰ(ݐ) → ∞  when ݐ → ∞. Initially ଷܰ(0) = 0 at ݐ = 0 and as the time increases ଷܰ(ݐ) reaches to ∞. 
So ଷܰ(ݐ) is also unlimited. 
Really on a semi interval [0, ∞) function ଵܰ(ݐ) and ଶܰ(ݐ) are unlimited from above. Figure 2 shows the dynamical 
behaviour of the different group spreading information with respect to time.  
Thus, at ܦ = ܽଶ − 8ܾܿ > 0 and equal starting a condition ( ଵܰ = ଶܰ) the opposite sides, strengthen their activity 
and cyber war does not stop. 
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Fig.2.  Dynamical behaviour of the system at N1=N2=2, N3=0 
 
Case 1.2  (ࡺ૚ > ࡺ૛) 
 
If at the opposite sides, a starting condition of the first side (X) is more than the second side (Y), function ଵܰ(ݐ) 
at ݐ ∈ [0,∞) is increasing and also unlimited (from 1.1). 
ଶܰ(ݐ) at ݐ = 0 is positive and at  ݐ → ∞, ଶܰ(ݐ) → −∞.   
At ݐ → ∞, ଷܰ(ݐ) → ∞.   
Thus, it is necessary to notice that the third side Z have partial influence on a course of cyber war. In particular, it 
influences one of the sides if the opposite sides have begun cyber war under unequal ଵܰ ≠ ଶܰ starting conditions. 
Thus, the third side Z influences that opposite side which launching site is weaker". i.e. it is less. And this side, 
through certain time stops cyber war though initially actively joins in it, leaves on a maximum of actions, however 
then, reduces cyber attacks, and in the end and at all of them stops. Figure 3shows the behavior of information 
extended by different groups with respect to time. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Dynamical behaviour of the system at N1=4, N2=2, N3=0 
 
 
Case 1.3  (ࡺ૚ < ࡺ૛) 
 
If at the opposite sides starting conditions of the second side (Y) is more than the first (X), i.e. ଵܰ < ଶܰ, then the 
sides change roles and is received symmetric results. 
 
Fig. 4. Dynamical behaviour of the system at N1=2, N2=4, N3=0. 
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In this case, a square of an index of aggression less than eightfold product of indexes of readiness for the world and 
peace-making activity, i.e. it is expected that peace-making activity will pacify aggression. 
 
Case 2.1      (ࡺ૚ = ࡺ૛) 
 
Really, if the peacemaking organizations have not taken preventive measures and the opposite sides have begun 
cyber war at equal initial condition, then influence of the peacemaking organizations on the first and the second the 
sides must be fruitful. Figure 5 shows the behaviour of the group X, Y and Z with respect to Group time 
respectively.  
ଵܰ(ݐ) = ଶ√ଶ௕௖ேభ௘
ೌ
మ೟
√ି஽
 sin (ඥ଼௕௖ି௔మଶ ݐ + ߠ), ଶܰ(ݐ) = +
ଶ√ଶ௕௖ேభ௘
ೌ
మ೟
√ି஽
 sin (ඥ଼௕௖ି௔మଶ ݐ + ߠ) and 
ସ௖ேభ
√ି஽
݁
ೌ
మ௧sin (ඥ଼௕௖ି௔మଶ ݐ)  
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Behaviour of the information extended by group X, Y and Z with respect to time respectively.  
 
Case 2.2 (ࡺ૚ > ࡺ૛) 
 
If at the opposite sides the starting conditions of the first side (X) is more than the second (Y) from (1.9), we will 
find time when the first side stops cyber war. Figure 6 shows the behavior of information extended by group X, Y 
and Z with respect to time respectively. 
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c 
 
Fig. 6. (a) Behaviour of the information extended by group X with respect to time.  (b) Behaviour of the information extended by group Y with 
respect to time. (c) Behaviour of the information extended by group Z with respect to time at N1=3, N2=2, N3=0 
 
 
Case 2.3  (ࡺ૚ < ࡺ૛)  
 
If at the antagonistic sides different starting conditions, and starting position of the second side more the first, the 
first and second sides change roles and is had symmetric results as case 2.2. 
 
Case 3   a2-8bc = 0 
    
In this case the aggression index is still high and there are analogies to a case 1.  
 
Case 3.1 ( ଵܰ = ଶܰ) 
 
In this case when the peacemaking organizations have not taken preventive method ( ଷܰ = 0), and the opposite sides 
have begun cyber war at equal starting condition ( N1= N2), influence peacemaking organizations on the first and 
second sides. Figure 7 shows the behavior of information extended by group X, Y and Z with respect to time 
respectively. 
 
ଵܰ(ݐ) → ∞, ଶܰ(ݐ) → ∞ ܽ݊݀ ଷܰ(ݐ) → ∞ when ݐ → ∞ 
ଵܰ(ݐ) = ଶேభଶ௔ (ܽ + 4ܾܿݐ)݁
ೌ
మ௧  
ଶܰ(ݐ) = ଶேభଶ௔ (ܽ + 4ܾܿݐ)݁
ೌ
మ௧  
ଷܰ(ݐ) = 2 ଵܰܿݐ݁
ೌ
మ௧  
       
a                       b   
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  c  
 
 
Fig. 7. (a) Behaviour of the information extended by group X with respect to time.  (b) Behaviour of the information extended by group Y with 
respect to time. (c) Behaviour of the information extended by group Z with respect to time at  N1=N2=4, N3=0. 
 
Case 3.2  (ࡺ૚ < ࡺ૛)  
 
If at the opposite sides starting conditions of the first side less than the second from (1.9), having equated to zero 
function  ଶܰ(ݐ ) we will find time when the second side stops information warfare. Figure 8 shows the behavior of 
information extended by different groups X, Y and Z with respect to time.  
 
Fig. 8. Dynamical behaviour of the system at N1=2, N2=10, N3=0 
 
Case 3.3  ࡺ૚ > ࡺ૛  
 
If at the opposite sides different starting conditions, and starting position of the first side more the second, the 
second  and first sides change roles and is had symmetric results for ଵܰ(ݐ) ܽ݊݀ ଶܰ(ݐ). 
 
4. Stability Analysis 
Stability of equilibrium points gives information about the long term behaviour of the model. Stability analysis is 
an important mathematical tool that provides the conditions that guarantee the stability of equilibrium point.   
For equilibrium points we have, 
ௗேభ(௧)
ௗ௧ = 0,
ௗேమ(௧)
ௗ௧ = 0,
ௗேయ(௧)
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ܧ = (0,0,0) is the only equilibrium point of the system (1). 
The given system of differential equation (1) can be written as ܺ̇ = ܣܺ  
Where, ܣ = ൭
ܽ 0 −ܾ
0 ܽ −ܾ
ܿ ܿ 0
൱ 
Characteristic equation of A is given as |ܣ − ߣܫ| = 0 
Which gives,  ߣଷ − 2ܽߣଶ + ߣ(ܽଶ + 2ܾܿ) − 2ܾܽܿ = 0 
Jacobian matrix J is given as 
A
J













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
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
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




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

0
0
0
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Applying Routh Hurwitz criteria we get two sign change in the first column of Routh Array. The first column of 
Routh Array is 1,−2ܽ, ܽଶ + ܾܿ, (2ܽଶ + 3ܾܿ)ܾܽܿ. 
Since there are changes in sign so the system is not stable and the number of roots in the right half plane is equal to 
number of sign changes. 
So, Number of sign changes = Number of roots in the right half plane=2. Fig. 9 shows unstable equilibrium points at 
(0, 0). This unstable equilibrium point is a spiral. 
a                   b 
 
Fig. 9. (a) Dynamical behaviour of the system in unstable equilibrium point in 3D. (b)  Dynamical behaviour of the system in unstable 
equilibrium point. 
 
Conclusion 
  In this paper we propose a Mathematical model on cyber war by considering rate of change of information 
between different groups. We discussed the detailed analysis of the model in different values of D (Table 1) 
supported by simulated results. We also present stability analysis of the model supported by simulated results. The 
initial parameter values were chosen to suit a real cyber war scenario. Runge-Kutta Fehlberg method of order 4 and 
5 were employed to solve and simulate the system of equations (1). The behavior of the system with respect to time 
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is analyzed at different condition. 
Table 1. 
Condition on D     Parametric values 
ܦ > 0  ܽ = 50;ܾ = 5; ܿ = 2  
ܦ < 0  ܽ = 8; ܾ = 80; ܿ = 2 
ܦ = 0  ܽ = 4;ܾ = 2; ܿ = 1 
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